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SURVEY SECTION
Family Law. Becker v. Perkins-Becker, 669 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1996).
A spouse's enhanced earning capacity from an advanced degree ob-
tained during marriage is not a marital asset subject to equitable
distribution.
In Becker v. Perkins-Becker,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court
determined that professional degrees and licenses, and the en-
hanced earning capacity resulting therefrom, are not marital as-
sets subject to equitable distribution.2 Consequently, upon the
dissolution of a marriage, the value attributable to such a profes-
sional degree or license may not be included in the marital asset
distribution. 3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
After five years of marriage, Daniel Becker (husband) and
Kleo Perkins-Becker (wife) separated in January 1990. 4 The hus-
band was a licensed chiropractor and had been engaged in the pro-
fession for one year prior to the marriage.5 During the course of
the marriage, Dr. Becker received an advanced degree in the field
of chiropractic neurology, qualifying him to conduct neurological
procedures that he was previously not certified to perform.6
At trial, Dr. Becker's annual income was determined to be
$126,904 and, based on the testimony of a certified public account-
ant, the market value of his chiropractic practice was determined
to be $134,463. 7 The trial court found that the practice had little
or no market value prior to the marriage and that the increased
value derived from the joint efforts of both parties.8
During the initial divorce proceedings, Mrs. Becker attempted
to include Dr. Becker's advanced degree in the division of property.
The wife offered expert testimony regarding the value of that de-
gree.9 Pursuant to the husband's objection and motion in limine, a
written order was entered in which the trial judge found as a mat-
1. 669 A-2d 524 (MI. 1996).
2. Id. at 531-32.
3. Id
4. i& at 526.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 530.
7. Id. at 528.
8. Id. at 526.
9. Id. at 530.
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ter of law, that the enhanced earning capacity of the advanced de-
gree was not a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. 10
The wife's proposed testimony was ruled inadmissible.:" On her
cross-appeal, the wife contended that the trial court erred as a
matter of law in holding that the husband's advanced degree ac-
quired during the marriage was not a marital asset.
BACKGROUND
Rhode Island General Laws section 15-5-16.1(a), currently
governing the distribution of marital assets, provides:
[T]he court may assign to either the husband or wife a portion
of the estate of the other .... [IThe court ... shall consider...
the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during
the marriage, [and] the contribution of each of the parties...
in the acquisition, preservation, or appreciation in value of
their respective estates, [and] the contribution and services of
either party as a homemaker .... The court may not assign
property or an interest therein held in the name of one of the
parties if the property was held by the party prior to the mar-
riage, but may assign income which has been derived there-
from during the term of the marriage, and the court may
assign the appreciation in value from the date of the mar-
riage of property or an interest therein which was held in the
name of one party prior to the marriage which increased in
value as a result of the efforts of either spouse during the
marriage.' 2
Section 15-5-16.1(a) was amended in 1992, and as a conse-
quence, a court may now consider "the contribution by one party to
the education, training, licensure, business or increased earning
power of the other."13 However, since the Beckers filed for divorce
in 1989, the 1992 amendment did not apply.' 4 Faced with an issue
of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the
case law of other jurisdictions in order to interpret the instant case
in light of section 15-5-16.1.15
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a) (1988), as amended by 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws
ch. 269, § 2.
13. 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 269, § 2(a)(9).
14. Becker, 669 A.2d at 528 n.2. The amended statute applies to cases filed on
or after July 7, 1993. Id. at 528.
15. Id. at 530-32.
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A majority of courts addressing this issue have held neither a
professional degree, nor the resulting increased earning capacity,
is a marital asset subject to equitable assignment. 16 In Drapek v.
Drapek,17 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
the husband's medical degree received during the marriage and his
enhanced earning capacity were not marital assets subject to equi-
table assignment.18 In so holding, the court cited the impractica-
bility of determining the present value of future earned income for
the purposes of division because of the amount of speculation re-
quired.19 Furthermore, the inflexibility of present assignment of
value eliminates consideration of the possible effect of future
events on the earning capacity of the professional. 20
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Graham,21 the Colorado
Supreme Court held that an educational degree, such as a master's
in business administration, is not "property" subject to division in
a divorce proceeding.22 The court stated that an educational de-
gree possessed none of the attributes of property, and recognized a
degree as "simply an educational achievement that may poten-
tially assist in the future acquisition of property."23 A degree has
no exchange value and no objective transferable value on an open
market.24 It is not inheritable, and it terminates on the death of
the holder.25 Moreover, it may be acquired through many years of
education and cannot be acquired by mere purchase.2 6 Unlike
16. Id.; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1987); In re Mar-
riage of Weinstein, 470 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. 1984); Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074
(Md. 1985); Davey v. Davey, 415 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982); Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio
1986); Pacht v. Jadd, 469 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio 1983); Hodge v. Hodge, 529 A.2d 15
(Pa. 1986). While the prevailing view excludes professional degrees and licenses
from the definition of marital property, courts have held that increased earning
capacity engendered by a professional degree and a spouse's financial contribu-
tions to the other spouse's achievement of the professional degree may both be
considered in awarding alimony. See, e.g., Drapek v. Drapek, 503 N.E.2d 946, 949-
50 (Mass. 1987).
17. 503 N.E.2d 946 (Mass. 1987).
18. Id at 949-50.
19. Id. at 949 (citing Cabot v. Cabot, 462 N-E.2d 1128 (1984)).
20. I&
21. 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
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property, it cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or
pledged.2 7
There appears to be only one jurisdiction that has held that a
professional degree is marital property. In O'Brien v. O'Brien,28
the New York Court of Appeals determined that a professional li-
cense, viz., a license to practice medicine, acquired during the mar-
riage is marital property subject to equitable distribution.2 9 The
court found that the inclusion of a professional license attained
during the marriage was mandated by New York Domestic Rela-
tions Law section 236(B)(1)(6), which provided that contributions
and expenditures made toward furthering a spouse's education
should be considered in distributing marital property.30 As such,
the court asserted that the spouse, who presumably worked while
the other spouse attended school, was entitled to an equitable por-
tion of the value of the license.31 As marital property, the value of
the license was equivalent to the enhanced earning capacity of its
holder.3 2
ANALYsIS AND HOLDING
Adhering to the majority of jurisdictions, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held in Becker that professional licenses and de-
grees, and the attendant enhanced earning capacity of the holder
spouse, are not marital property to be equitably distributed under
Rhode Island General Laws section 15-5-16.1. s3 Adopting the rea-
soning of Drapek, the court stated that to "embrace a rule that
would subject such an item to distribution upon dissolution would
result in the foreclosure of consideration of the effect on the indi-
vidual's earning capacity of such future events as death, illness, or
unpredictable market variables."s4 Therefore, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude the husband's profes-
sional degree from the marital property, as well as its decision to
exclude the wife's testimony on that issue.35
27. Id-
28. 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
29. Id. at 713.
30. Id. at 716-17.
31. Id. at 717.
32. Id
33. Becker, 669 A.2d at 531-32.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 532.
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CONCLUSION
In Becker, the Rhode Island Supreme Court explicitly adopted
the majority view that professional degrees with their enhance-
ment of earning potential are not marital property. However, the
Rhode Island Legislature appears to have adopted the minority po-
sition of O'Brien. Under the 1992 amendment to section 15-5-16.1,
contributions by one spouse to the education and increased earning
power of the other can now be considered in determining the na-
ture and value of the marital property.3 s Because the Beckers filed
for divorce in 1989, the 1992 amendment was inapplicable to them.
However, in view of the amended statute, Rhode Island courts now
will consider the value of an advanced degree along with the other
factors enumerated in the amended statute.
Michael J. Williams
36. 1992 RI. Pub. Laws ch. 269, § 2(aX9).
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Family Law. Duke v. Duke, 675 A.2d 822 (R.I. 1996). Neither
state nor municipal pensions are immune from court orders to use
those funds for child support, even though they contain provisions
prohibiting either attachment or assignment.
In Duke v. Duke,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered
whether the use of public pension funds for child support consti-
tuted an exception to provisions exempting such funds from at-
tachment or assignment.2 In upholding a family court order
attaching a firefighter's pension funds to pay child support, the
court held that such provisions were "designed to deal with credi-
tors and not the families of employees," 3 and that the order would
not "constitute an assignment within the meaning of the statute."4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Charlotte Duke (plaintiff) and Gordon Duke (defendant) di-
vorced in 1984.5 Plaintiff filed an action in family court, charging
that the defendant was delinquent in making child support pay-
ments. 6 In 1992, the family court found the defendant "in willful
contempt" of his obligation to pay child support, and ordered that
his pension fund be attached, with the balance deposited with the
court to satisfy those payments.7 In 1994, an order was entered
directing the Employees' Retirement System of the City of Provi-
dence to close out defendant's pension, distribute to the plaintiff
certain amounts due her, and deposit the remainder in the family
court registry to be used for further payments owed.8 The defend-
ant filed a petition with the Rhode Island Supreme Court for a writ
1. 675 A.2d 822 (R.I. 1996).
2. Id. at 823. "No interest of any person in any pension fund or in any pen-
sion derivable therefrom, for the benefit of policemen or firemen... shall be sub-
ject to trustee process or liable to attachment... or any process, legal or equitable;
and no assignment of any such interest shall be valid." R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-26-5
(1985). "[Tlhe right of a member or beneficiary to a pension... and the monies in
the various funds created hereunder.., shall not be assignable, subject to execu-
tion, garnishment, attachment.., or any other similar process of law." Providence,
R.I., Code § 17-193 (1991), quoted in Duke, 675 A.2d at 823.
3. Duke, 675 A.2d at 823 (citing Moran v. Moran, 612 A.2d 26, 33 (R.I. 1992);
Young v. Young, 488 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 1985)).
4. Id.
5. Id at 822.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 822-23.
8. Id. at 823.
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of certiorari for review of the order.9 Both the defendant and the
City of Providence filed a motion to continue a stay of the order
that had been previously granted by the lower court pending such
review, which was granted. 10
BACKGROUND
In Stevenson v. Stevenson," the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that an anti-attachment statute did not preclude a police of-
ficer's pension from being valued as a marital asset upon divorce.' 2
Stevenson was a case of first impression in Rhode Island on the
issue of whether pension funds that are protected by anti-attach-
ment statutes may be viewed as marital assets.' 3 In its decision,
the court noted that "a pension is... analogous in form to a forced
savings account whose funds will become available to the parties
upon retirement, [and are thus] correctly considered... to be mari-
tal property."14 The court held there was no assignment within the
meaning of the exemption statute, because the lower court only
calculated the value of the husband's pension for the purposes of
distributing the marital assets, and did not assign any interest in
it to the wife.' 5 Thus, Stevenson left open the question of whether
an exemption statute would preclude division of a public em-
ployee's pension upon divorce,' 6 noting that the majority of courts
viewed pension funds as marital property.' 7
In 1992, the supreme court addressed the issue of whether a
municipal employee's pension fund could be divided as part of a
divorce settlement in Moran v. Moran,'8 holding that an "exemp-
tion statute was not intended to deprive a family of pension bene-
fits or to allow a retiree to evade his familial support obligation."19
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 511 A.2d 961 (ILI. 1986).
12. Id. at 965.
13. Id. at 964.
14. Id. at 965.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 966.
17. Id. at 964-65 (citations omitted).
18. 612 A.2d 26 (R.I. 1992).
19. Id. at 33 (citing Young v. Young, 488 A.2d 264 (Pa. 1985)). In Moran, the
employee was a teacher whose municipal employee's pension plan was exempted
by statute from lien, attachment, garnishment, assignment or transfer. LI. Gen
Laws § 36-10-34 (1990), quoted in Moran, 612 A.2d at 31.
1997] 481
482 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:480
Moran expressly adopted the reasoning set forth by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Young v. Young,20 noting that the
Young court had considered the legislative intent "in creating the
pension statute and the rationale behind strict enforcement of sup-
port orders."21 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the
apparent discrepancy between the clear statutory language and its
holding, stating that the purpose of the exemption clause22 was to
protect the family, which outweighed any government interest in
not having to comply with attachment orders.23 The Young court
also held that its reading of the statute was correct 24 because it
reached a reasonable result,2 5 it favored the public interest in not
having to support families because of an individual's refusal to do
so, and it promoted justice "between the parties."26 The Moran
court agreed with Young that to preclude pensions from equitable
distribution would "lead to absurd and unfair results," and stated
that "w]e do not believe that the Legislature intended this exemp-
tion statute to create such inequities within the family."27 In ac-
knowledging that it had not previously addressed the issue of
whether public pensions are subject to assignment notwithstand-
ing exemption provisions, Moran made clear that there would be
exceptions to such exemptions, at least in the area of family
welfare. 28
ANALYSIS AND HOLDNG
In Duke, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first noted that the
state anti-attachment statute, Rhode Island General Laws section
9-26-5, did not prevent the family court from ordering payment of
20. 488 A.2d 264 (Pa. 1985).
21. Moran, 612 A.2d at 33.
22. Young, 488 A.2d at 268. The municipal pension in Young contained a pro-
vision stating that "[tihe compensation or pension herein mentioned shall not be
subject to attachment or execution, and shall be payable only to the beneficiary
designated, and shall not be subject to assignment or transfer." Id. at 265-66.
23. Id. at 267-68.
24. Id at 267 (Anti-attachment statutes should be "liberally construed to ef-
fect [sic) their objects and promote justice.").
25. Id. The court noted that a pension fund represents deferred income, and it
would be unfair to deprive children or a former spouse of those benefits in the
future. 'We do not believe that the legislature intended to create such an unrea-
sonable result." Id. at 269.
26. Id
27. Moran v. Moran, 612 A.2d 26, 33 (R.I. 1992).
28. Id.
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child support from a pension fund, because the statute was in-
tended to protect such funds from creditors, not families.29 Next,
the court referred to its previous holding in Stevenson, stating that
because pensions were a form of forced savings that deprived a
family of the present use of income, they should be considered
"marital property, subject to division along with the employee's
other assets."30 Whether the pension belonged to a policeman (Ste-
venson) or a firefighter (Duke), made no difference to the court.3 '
While not expressly citing to either Stevenson or Moran, the court
stated that the exemption statute was not meant to prevent the
family court from ordering the fulfillment of a support obligation
(Moran), nor was it an assignment within the meaning of the stat-
ute (Stevenson).32
Finally, the court held that the municipal anti-attachment or-
dinance, Providence Ordinance section 17-193, did not protect the
pension funds from being used for child support, noting that
"[c]hild support is a statewide concern that a municipal ordinance
may not impede or frustrate in its implementation."3 3 Thus, a
court may order that both state and municipal pension funds can
be reached for the purpose of child support, despite anti-attach-
ment provisions. 34
CONCLUSION
While anti-attachment provisions in pension funds purport to
prevent any attachment or assignment, Rhode Island, like some
other courts, 35 construes such provisions as being intended to pro-
tect the funds from creditors, thus remaining available for the ben-
efit of the pensioner's family. While Stevenson and Moran
29. Duke v. Duke, 675 A.2d 822, 823 (ILI. 1996) (citing Moran, 612 A-2d at
33).
30. Id (citing Stevenson v. Stevenson, 511 A.2d 961, 965 (RI. 1986)).
31. Id.
32. Id. To avoid direct attachment, the court modified the family court's order
to require the defendant to assign the funds to the plaintiff for her use. Id. at 824.
33. Id- at 823-24.
34. Id.
35. In re Marriage of Branstetter, 508 N.W.2d 638 (Iowa 1993) (pension is
marital asset subject to division, despite anti-attachment statute); Hollman v.
Hollman, 528 A-2d 146 (Pa. 1987) (following Young v. Young, 488 A.2d 264 (Pa.
1985)); Fans v. Faus, 319 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1982) (claims of a firefighter's depen-
dents for child support are an exception to the pension exemption statute). But see
Fowler v. Fowler, 362 A-2d 204 (N.H. 1976); Ogle v. Ogle, 442 P.2d 659 (Cal. 1968).
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addressed the issue of pensions as marital assets, Duke filled a gap
in this area of the law by holding that anti-attachment provisions
do not bar pension funds from being reached by court order to ful-
fill child support obligations.
Renee G. Vogel, MD, MPH
